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Parallel universes are now all the rage, cropping up in
books, movies and even jokes: “You passed your exam in
many parallel universes — but not this one.” However,
they are as controversial as they are popular, and it is
important to ask whether they are within the purview
of science, or merely silly speculation. They are also
a source of confusion, since many forget to distinguish
between different types of parallel universes that have
been proposed.
The farthest you can observe is the distance that light
has been able to travel during the 14 billion years since
the big-bang expansion began. The most distant visi-
ble objects are now about 4 × 1026 meters away1, and a
sphere of this radius defines our observable universe, also
called our Hubble volume, our horizon volume or simply
our universe. In this article, I survey physics theories in-
volving parallel universes, which form a natural four-level
hierarchy of multiverses (Figure 1) allowing progressively
greater diversity.
• Level I: A generic prediction of cosmological infla-
tion is an infinite “ergodic” space, which contains
Hubble volumes realizing all initial conditions —
including an identical copy of you about 1010
29
m
away.
• Level II: Given the fundamental laws of physics
that physicists one day hope to capture with equa-
tions on a T-shirt, different regions of space can
exhibit different effective laws of physics (physi-
cal constants, dimensionality, particle content, etc.)
corresponding to different local minima in a land-
scape of possibilities.
• Level III: In unitary quantum mechanics, other
branches of the wavefunction add nothing qualita-
tively new, which is ironic given that this level has
historically been the most controversial.
• Level IV: Other mathematical structures give dif-
ferent fundamental equations of physics for that T-
shirt.
The key question is therefore not whether there is a mul-
tiverse (since Level I is the rather uncontroversial cosmo-
logical concordance model), but rather how many levels
it has.
Below we will discuss at length the issue of evidence
and whether this is science or philosophy. For now, the
1 After emitting the light that is now reaching us, the most distant
things we can see have receded because of the cosmic expansion,
and are now about about 40 billion light years away.
key point to remember is that parallel universes are not a
theory, but a prediction of certain theories. For a theory
to be falsifiable, we need not be able to observe and test
all its predictions, merely at least one of them. Consider
the following analogy:
General Relativity Black hole interiors
Inflation Level I parallel universes
Unitary quantum mechanics Level III parallel universes
Because Einstein’s theory of General Relativity has suc-
cessfully predicted many things that we can observe,
we also take seriously its predictions for things we can-
not observe, e.g., that space continues inside black hole
event horizons and that (contrary to early misconcep-
tions) nothing funny happens right at the horizon. Like-
wise, successful predictions of the theories of cosmologi-
cal inflation and unitary2 quantum mechanics have made
some scientists take more seriously their other predic-
tions, including various types of parallel universes.
Let us conclude with two cautionary remarks before
delving into the details. Hu¨bris and lack of imagina-
tion have repeatedly caused us humans to underestimate
the vastness of the physical world, and dismissing things
merely because we cannot observe them from our van-
tage point is reminiscent of the ostrich with its head in
the sand. Moreover, recent theoretical insights have in-
dicated that Nature may be tricking us. Einstein taught
us that space is not merely a boring static void, but
a dynamic entity that can stretch (the expanding uni-
verse), vibrate (gravitational waves) and curve (gravity).
Searches for a unified theory also suggest that space can
“freeze”, transitioning between different phases in a land-
scape of possibilities just like water can be solid, liquid or
gas. In different phases, effective laws of physics (parti-
cles, symmetries, etc..) could differ. A fish never leaving
the ocean might mistakenly conclude that the properties
of water are universal, not realizing that there is also
ice and steam. We may be smarter than fish, but could
be similarly fooled: cosmological inflation has the de-
ceptive property of stretching a small patch of space in
a particular phase so that it fills our entire observable
universe, potentially tricking us into misinterpreting our
local conditions for the universal laws that should go on
that T-shirt.
2 As described below, the mathematically simplest version of quan-
tum mechanics is “unitary”, lacking the controversial process
known as wavefunction collapse.
2
3I. LEVEL I: REGIONS BEYOND OUR COSMIC
HORIZON
Let us return to your distant twin. If space is infi-
nite and the distribution of matter is sufficiently uniform
on large scales, then even the most unlikely events must
take place somewhere. In particular, there are infinitely
many other inhabited planets, including not just one but
infinitely many with people with the same appearance,
name and memories as you. Indeed, there are infinitely
many other regions the size of our observable universe,
where every possible cosmic history is played out. This
is the Level I multiverse.
A. Evidence for Level I parallel universes
Although the implications may seem crazy and
counter-intuitive, this spatially infinite cosmological
model is in fact the simplest and most popular one on
the market today. It is part of the cosmological concor-
dance model, which agrees with all current observational
evidence and is used as the basis for most calculations
and simulations presented at cosmology conferences. In
contrast, alternatives such as a fractal universe, a closed
universe and a multiply connected universe have been se-
riously challenged by observations. Yet the Level I mul-
tiverse idea has been controversial (indeed, an assertion
along these lines was one of the heresies for which the Vat-
ican had Giordano Bruno burned at the stake in 16003),
so let us review the status of the two assumptions (infi-
nite space and “sufficiently uniform” distribution).
How large is space? Observationally, the lower bound
has grown dramatically (Figure 2) with no indication of
an upper bound. We all accept the existence of things
that we cannot see but could see if we moved or waited,
like ships beyond the horizon. Objects beyond cosmic
horizon have similar status, since the observable universe
grows by a light-year every year as light from further
away has time to reach us4. If anything, the Level I mul-
tiverse sounds trivially obvious. How could space not be
infinite? Is there a sign somewhere saying ”Space Ends
Here–Mind the Gap”? If so, what lies beyond it? In
fact, Einstein’s theory of gravity calls this intuition into
question. Space could be finite if it has a convex curva-
ture or an unusual topology (that is, interconnectedness).
A spherical, doughnut-shaped or pretzel-shaped universe
would have a limited volume and no edges. The cosmic
microwave background radiation allows sensitive tests of
such scenarios. So far, however, the evidence is against
3 Bruno’s ideas have since been elaborated by, e.g., Brundrit
(1979), Garriga & Vilenkin (2001b) and Ellis (2002), all of whom
have thus far avoided the stake.
4 If the cosmic expansion continues to accelerate (currently an
open question), the observable universe will eventually stop grow-
ing.
FIG. 2: Although an infinite universe has always been a pos-
sibility, the lower limit on the size of our universe has kept
growing.
them. Infinite models fit the data, and strong limits have
been placed on the alternatives (de Oliveira-Costa et al.
2003; Cornish et al. 2003). In addition, a spatially infi-
nite universe is a generic prediction of the cosmological
theory of inflation (Garriga & Vilenkin 2001b), so the
striking successes of inflation listed below therefore lend
further support to the idea that space is after all simple
and infinite just as we learned in school.
Another loophole is that space is infinite but matter is
confined to a finite region around us–the historically pop-
ular ”island universe” model. In a variant on this model,
matter thins out on large scales in a fractal pattern. In
both cases, almost all universes in the Level I multiverse
would be empty and dead. But recent observations of the
three-dimensional galaxy distribution and the microwave
background have shown that the arrangement of matter
gives way to dull uniformity on large scales, with no co-
herent structures larger than about 1024 meters. Assum-
ing that this pattern continues, space beyond our observ-
able universe teems with galaxies, stars and planets.
B. What are Level I parallel universes like?
The physics description of the world is traditionally
split into two parts: initial conditions and laws of physics
specifying how the initial conditions evolve. Observers
living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial
conditions than those in our Hubble volume. The cur-
rently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the
densities and motions of different types of matter early
on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the in-
flation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism
generates initial conditions that are for all practical pur-
poses random, producing density fluctuations described
by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field.
Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensem-
ble of universes, each with its own random initial con-
ditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in
a given volume is identical to the distribution that you
4get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In
other words, it means that everything that could in prin-
ciple have happened here did in fact happen somewhere
else.
Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions
with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being al-
most uniform with fluctuations at the 10−5 level that
are amplified by gravitational clustering to form galaxies,
stars, planets and other structures. This means both that
pretty much all imaginable matter configurations occur
in some Hubble volume far away, and also that we should
expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one
— at least typical among those that contain observers.
A crude estimate suggests that the closest identical copy
of you is about ∼ 1010
29
m away. About ∼ 1010
91
m away,
there should be a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical
to the one centered here, so all perceptions that we have
during the next century will be identical to those of our
counterparts over there. About ∼ 1010
115
m away, there
should be an entire Hubble volume identical to ours.5
This raises an interesting philosophical point that will
come back and haunt us in Section VB: if there are
indeed many copies of “you” with identical past lives and
memories, you would not be able to compute your own
future even if you had complete knowledge of the entire
state of the cosmos! The reason is that there is no way
for you to determine which of these copies is “you” (they
all feel that they are). Yet their lives will typically begin
to differ eventually, so the best you can do is predict
probabilities for what you will experience from now on.
This kills the traditional notion of determinism.
C. How a multiverse theory can be tested and
falsified
Is a multiverse theory one of metaphysics rather than
physics? As emphasized by Karl Popper, the distinc-
tion between the two is whether the theory is empirically
testable and falsifiable. Containing unobservable enti-
ties does clearly not per se make a theory non-testable.
For instance, a theory stating that there are 666 paral-
lel universes, all of which are devoid of oxygen makes
5 This is an extremely conservative estimate, simply counting all
possible quantum states that a Hubble volume can have that are
no hotter than 108K. 10115 is roughly the number of protons
that the Pauli exclusion principle would allow you to pack into
a Hubble volume at this temperature (our own Hubble volume
contains only about 1080 protons). Each of these 10115 slots can
be either occupied or unoccupied, giving N = 210
115
∼ 1010
115
possibilities, so the expected distance to the nearest identical
Hubble volume is N1/3 ∼ 1010
115
Hubble radii ∼ 1010
115
meters.
Your nearest copy is likely to be much closer than 1010
29
meters,
since the planet formation and evolutionary processes that have
tipped the odds in your favor are at work everywhere. There
are probably at least 1020 habitable planets in our own Hubble
volume alone.
the testable prediction that we should observe no oxygen
here, and is therefore ruled out by observation.
As a more serious example, the Level I multiverse
framework is routinely used to rule out theories in mod-
ern cosmology, although this is rarely spelled out explic-
itly. For instance, cosmic microwave background (CMB)
observations have recently shown that space has almost
no curvature. Hot and cold spots in CMB maps have a
characteristic size that depends on the curvature of space,
and the observed spots appear too large to be consis-
tent with the previously popular “open universe” model.
However, the average spot size randomly varies slightly
from one Hubble volume to another, so it is important to
be statistically rigorous. When cosmologists say that the
open universe model is ruled out at 99.9% confidence,
they really mean that if the open universe model were
true, then fewer than one out of every thousand Hubble
volumes would show CMB spots as large as those we ob-
serve — therefore the entire model with all its infinitely
many Hubble volumes is ruled out, even though we have
of course only mapped the CMB in our own particular
Hubble volume.
The lesson to learn from this example is that multi-
verse theories can be tested and falsified, but only if they
predict what the ensemble of parallel universes is and
specify a probability distribution (or more generally what
mathematicians call a measure) over it. As we will see in
Section VB, this measure problem can be quite serious
and is still unsolved for some multiverse theories.
II. LEVEL II: OTHER POST-INFLATION
BUBBLES
If you felt that the Level I multiverse was large and
hard to stomach, try imagining an infinite set of distinct
ones (each symbolized by a bubble in Figure 1), some per-
haps with different dimensionality and different physical
constants. This is what is predicted by most currently
popular models of inflation, and we will refer to it as
the Level II multiverse. These other domains are more
than infinitely far away in the sense that you would never
get there even if you traveled at the speed of light for-
ever. The reason is that the space between our Level I
multiverse and its neighbors is still undergoing inflation,
which keeps stretching it out and creating more volume
faster than you can travel through it. In contrast, you
could travel to an arbitrarily distant Level I universe if
you were patient and the cosmic expansion decelerates.6
6 Astronomical evidence suggests that the cosmic expansion is
currently accelerating. If this acceleration continues, then even
the level I parallel universes will remain forever separate, with the
intervening space stretching faster than light can travel through
it. The jury is still out, however, with popular models predicting
that the universe will eventually stop accelerating and perhaps
even recollapse.
5A. Evidence for Level II parallel universes
Inflation is an extension of the big bang theory and
ties up many of the loose ends of that theory, such as
why the universe is so big, so uniform and so flat. A
rapid stretching of space long ago can explain all these
and other attributes in one fell swoop (see reviews by
Linde 1994 and Guth & Kaiser 2005). Such stretching is
predicted by a wide class of theories of elementary par-
ticles, and all available evidence bears it out. Much of
space is stretching and will continue doing so forever, but
some regions of space stop stretching and form distinct
bubbles, like gas pockets in a loaf of rising bread. In-
finitely many such bubbles emerge (Figure 1, lower left,
with time increasing upwards). Each is an embryonic
Level I multiverse: infinite in size7 and filled with matter
deposited by the energy field that drove inflation. Recent
cosmological measurements have confirmed two key pre-
dictions of inflation: that space has negligible curvature
and that the clumpiness in the cosmic matter distribution
use to be approximately scale invariant.
B. What are Level II parallel universes like?
The prevailing view is that the physics we observe to-
day is merely a low-energy limit of a much more general
theory that manifests itself at extremely high tempera-
tures. For example, this underlying fundamental theory
may be 10-dimensional, supersymmetric and involving a
grand unification of the four fundamental forces of na-
ture. A common feature in such theories is that the
potential energy of the field(s) relevant to inflation has
many different minima (sometimes called “metastable
vacuum states”), and ending up in different minima cor-
responds to different effective laws of physics for our
low-energy world. For instance, all but three spatial di-
mensions could be curled up (“compactified”) on a tiny
scale, resulting in an effectively three-dimensional space
like ours, or fewer could curl up leaving a 5-dimensional
space. Quantum fluctuations during inflation can there-
fore cause different post-inflation bubbles in the Level
II multiverse to end up with different effective laws of
physics in different bubbles — say different dimension-
ality or different types of elementary particles, like two
rather than three generations of quarks.
In addition to such discrete properties as dimensional-
ity and particle content, our universe is characterized by
a set of dimensionless numbers known as physical con-
stants. Examples include the electron/proton mass ra-
7 Surprisingly, it has been shown that inflation can produce an in-
finite Level I multiverse even in a bubble of finite spatial volume,
thanks to an effect whereby the spatial directions of spacetime
curve towards the (infinite) time direction (Bucher & Spergel
1999).
tio mp/me ≈ 1836 and the cosmological constant, which
appears to be about 10−123 in so-called Planck units.
There are models where also such non-integer parame-
ters can vary from one one post-inflationary bubble to
another.8 In summary, the Level II multiverse is likely
to be more diverse than the Level I multiverse, contain-
ing domains where not only the initial conditions differ,
but perhaps the dimensionality, the elementary particles
and the physical constants differ as well.
This is currently a very active research area. The pos-
sibility of a string theory “landscape” (Bousso & Polchin-
ski 2000; Susskind 2003), where the above-mentioned
potential has perhaps 10500 different minima, may of-
fer a specific realization of the Level II multiverse which
would in turn have four sub-levels of increasing diver-
sity: IId: different ways in which space can be compact-
ified, which can allow both different effective dimension-
ality and different symmetries/elementary articles (corre-
sponding to different topology of the curled up extra di-
mensions). IIc: different “fluxes” (generalized magnetic
fields) that stabilize the extra dimensions (this sublevel
is where the largest number of choices enter, perhaps
10500). IIb: once these two choices have been made,
there may be a handful of different minima in the effec-
tive supergravity potential. IIa: the same minimum and
effective laws of physics can be realized in a many differ-
ent post-inflationary bubbles, each constituting a Level I
multiverse.
Before moving on, let us briefly comment on a few
closely related multiverse notions. First of all, if one
Level II multiverse can exist, eternally self-reproducing in
a fractal pattern, then there may well be infinitely many
other Level II multiverses that are completely discon-
nected. However, this variant appears to be untestable,
since it would neither add any qualitatively different
worlds nor alter the probability distribution for their
properties. All possible initial initial conditions and sym-
metry breakings are already realized within each one.
An idea proposed by Tolman and Wheeler and recently
elaborated by Steinhardt & Turok (2002) is that the
(Level I) multiverse is cyclic, going through an infinite
series of Big Bangs. If it exists, the ensemble of such in-
carnations would also form a multiverse, arguably with
a diversity similar to that of Level II.
An idea proposed by Smolin (1997) involves an ensem-
8 Although the fundamental equations of physics are the same
throughout the Level II multiverse, the approximate effective
equations governing the low-energy world that we observe will
differ. For instance, moving from a three-dimensional to a four-
dimensional (non-compactified) space changes the observed grav-
itational force equation from an inverse square law to an inverse
cube law. Likewise, breaking the underlying symmetries of parti-
cle physics differently will change the lineup of elementary parti-
cles and the effective equations that describe them. However, we
will reserve the terms “different equations” and “different laws of
physics” for the Level IV multiverse, where it is the fundamental
rather than effective equations that change.
6FIG. 3: Why we should not be surprised to find ourselves
living in 3+1-dimensional spacetime. When the partial dif-
ferential equations of nature are elliptic or ultrahyperbolic,
physics has no predictive power for an observer. In the re-
maining (hyperbolic) cases, n > 3 admits no stable atoms and
n < 3 may lack sufficient complexity for observers (no grav-
itational attraction, topological problems). From Tegmark
(1997).
ble similar in diversity to that of Level II, but mutating
and sprouting new universes through black holes rather
than during inflation. This predicts a form of a natu-
ral selection favoring universes with maximal black hole
production.
In braneworld scenarios, another 3-dimensional world
could be quite literally parallel to ours, merely offset in a
higher dimension. However, it is unclear whether such a
world (“brane”) deserves be be called a parallel universe
separate from our own, since we may be able to interact
with it gravitationally much as we do with dark matter.
C. Fine-tuning and selection effects
Although we cannot interact with other Level II par-
allel universes, cosmologists can infer their presence in-
directly, because their existence can account for unex-
plained coincidences in our universe. To give an analogy,
suppose you check into a hotel, are assigned room 1967
and note that this is the year you were born. What a
coincidence, you say. After a moment of reflection, how-
ever, you conclude that this is not so surprising after all.
The hotel has hundreds of rooms, and you would not have
been having these thoughts in the first place if you had
been assigned one with a number that meant nothing to
you. The lesson is that even if you knew nothing about
hotels, you could infer the existence of other hotel rooms
to explain the coincidence.
As a more pertinent example, consider the mass of the
sun. The mass of a star determines its luminosity, and us-
ing basic physics, one can compute that life as we know
it on Earth is possible only if the sun’s mass falls into
the narrow range between 1.6× 1030kg and 2.4× 1030kg.
Otherwise Earth’s climate would be colder than that
of present-day Mars or hotter than that of present-day
Venus. The measured solar mass is M ∼ 2.0 × 1030kg.
At first glance, this apparent coincidence of the habitable
and observed mass values appears to be a wild stroke of
luck. Stellar masses run from 1029 to 1032kg, so if the sun
acquired its mass at random, it had only a small chance
of falling into the habitable range. But just as in the ho-
tel example, one can explain this apparent coincidence by
postulating an ensemble (in this case, a number of plan-
etary systems) and a selection effect (the fact that we
must find ourselves living on a habitable planet). Such
observer-related selection effects are referred to as “an-
thropic” (Carted 1973), and although the “A-word” is
notorious for triggering controversy, physicists broadly
agree that these selection effects cannot be neglected
when testing fundamental theories. In this weak sense,
the anthropic principle is not optional.
What applies to hotel rooms and planetary systems
applies to parallel universes. Most, if not all, of the
attributes set by symmetry breaking appear to be fine-
tuned. Changing their values by modest amounts would
have resulted in a qualitatively different universe–one in
which we probably would not exist. If protons were
0.2% heavier, they could decay into neutrons, destabiliz-
ing atoms. If the electromagnetic force were 4% weaker,
there would be no hydrogen and no normal stars. If the
weak interaction were much weaker, hydrogen would not
exist; if it were much stronger, supernovae would fail to
seed interstellar space with heavy elements. If the cos-
mological constant were much larger, the universe would
have blown itself apart before galaxies could form. In-
deed, most if not all the parameters affecting low-energy
physics appear fine-tuned at some level, in the sense that
changing them by modest amounts results in a qualita-
tively different universe.
Although the degree of fine-tuning is still debated (as
exemplified in the rest of this book; see Barrow & Tipler
1986, Tegmark 1998 & Hogan (2000) for more technical
reviews), these examples suggest the existence of parallel
universes with other values of some physical constants.
The existence of a Level II multiverse implies that physi-
cists will never be able to determine the values of all
physical constants from first principles. Rather, they
will merely compute probability distributions for what
they should expect to find, taking selection effects into
account. The result should be as generic as is consistent
with our existence.
7FIG. 4: Hints of fine-tuning for the parameters α and αs
which determine the strengths of the electromagnetic force
and the strong nuclear force, respectively (from Tegmark
1997). The observed values (α,αs) ≈ (1/137, 0.1) are indi-
cated with a filled square. Grand unified theories rule out
everything except the narrow strip between the two vertical
lines, and deuterium becomes unstable below the horizontal
line. In the narrow shaded region to the very left, electro-
magnetism is weaker than gravity and therefore irrelevant.
III. LEVEL III: THE MANY WORLDS OF
QUANTUM PHYSICS
There may be a third type of parallel worlds that are
not far away but in a sense right here. If the fundamental
equations of physics are what mathematicians call uni-
tary, as they so far appear to be, then the universe keeps
branching into parallel universes as in the cartoon (Fig-
ure 5, bottom): whenever a quantum event appears to
have a random outcome, all outcomes in fact occur, one
in each branch. This is the Level III multiverse. Al-
though more debated and controversial than Level I and
Level II, we will see that, surprisingly, this level adds no
new types of universes.
A. The quantum conundrum
In the early 20th century the theory of quantum me-
chanics revolutionized physics by explaining the atomic
realm, which does not abide by the classical rules of New-
tonian mechanics. Despite the obvious successes of the
theory, a heated debate rages about what it really means.
The theory specifies the state of the universe not in classi-
cal terms, such as the positions and velocities of all parti-
cles, but in terms of a mathematical object called a wave
FIG. 5: Difference between Level I and Level III. Whereas
Level I parallel universes are far away in space, those of Level
III are even right here, with quantum events causing classical
reality to split and diverge into parallel storylines. Yet Level
III adds no new storylines beyond levels 1 or 2.
function. According to the Schro¨dinger equation, this
state evolves over time in a fashion that mathematicians
term “unitary”, meaning that the wave function rotates
in an abstract infinite-dimensional space called Hilbert
space. Although quantum mechanics is often described
as inherently random and uncertain, the wave function
evolves in a deterministic way. There is nothing random
or uncertain about it.
The sticky part is how to connect this wave func-
tion with what we observe. Many legitimate wave func-
tions correspond to counterintuitive situations, such as
a cat being dead and alive at the same time in a so-
called superposition. In the 1920s physicists explained
away this weirdness by postulating that the wave func-
tion “collapse” into some definite classical outcome when-
ever someone made an observation. This add-on had
the virtue of explaining observations, but it turned an
elegant, unitary theory into a kludgy, nonunitary one,
since there was no equation specifying when or how this
collapse occurred. The intrinsic randomness commonly
ascribed to quantum mechanics is the result of this pos-
tulate, triggering Einstein’s objection that “God doesn’t
play dice”.
Over the years many physicists have abandoned this
8view in favor of one developed in 1957 by Princeton
graduate student Hugh Everett III. He showed that the
collapse postulate is unnecessary. Unadulterated quan-
tum theory does not, in fact, pose any contradictions.
Although it predicts that one classical reality gradu-
ally splits into superpositions of many such realities, ob-
servers subjectively experience this splitting merely as a
slight randomness (Figure 5), with probabilities in exact
agreement with those from the old collapse postulate (de
Witt 2003). This superposition of classical worlds is the
Level III multiverse.
B. What are Level III parallel universes like?
Everett’s many-worlds interpretation has been bog-
gling minds inside and outside physics for more than
four decades. But the theory becomes easier to grasp
when one distinguishes between two ways of viewing a
physical theory: the outside view of a physicist study-
ing its mathematical equations, like a bird surveying a
landscape from high above it, and the inside view of an
observer living in the world described by the equations,
like a frog living in the landscape surveyed by the bird.9.
From the bird perspective, the Level III multiverse
is simple. There is only one wave function. It evolves
smoothly and deterministically over time without any
kind of splitting or parallelism. The abstract quantum
world described by this evolving wave function contains
within it a vast number of parallel classical story lines,
continuously splitting and merging, as well as a number
of quantum phenomena that lack a classical description.
From their frog perspective, observers perceive only a
tiny fraction of this full reality. They can view their own
Level I universe, but a process called decoherence (Zeh
1970; Giulini et al. 1996) — which mimics wave function
9 Indeed, the standard mental picture of what the physical world
is corresponds to a third intermediate viewpoint that could be
termed the consensus view. From your subjectively perceived
frog perspective, the world turns upside down when you stand
on your head and disappears when you close your eyes, yet you
subconsciously interpret your sensory inputs as though there is
an external reality that is independent of your orientation, your
location and your state of mind. It is striking that although
this third view involves both censorship (like rejecting dreams),
interpolation (as between eye-blinks) and extrapolation (say at-
tributing existence to unseen cities) of your inside view, inde-
pendent observers nonetheless appear to share this consensus
view. Although the inside view looks black-and-white to a cat,
iridescent to a bird seeing four primary colors, and still more dif-
ferent to bee a seeing polarized light, a bat using sonar, a blind
person with keener touch and hearing, or the latest overpriced
robotic vacuum cleaner, all agree on whether the door is open.
The key current challenge in physics is deriving this semiclas-
sical consensus view from the fundamental equations specifying
the bird perspective. In my opinion, this means that although
understanding the detailed nature of human consciousness is an
important challenge in its own right, it is not necessary for a
fundamental theory of physics.
collapse while preserving unitarity–prevents them from
seeing Level III parallel copies of themselves.
Whenever observers are asked a question, make a snap
decision and give an answer, quantum effects in their
brains lead to a superposition of outcomes, such as “Con-
tinue reading the article” and “Put down the article”.
From the bird perspective, the act of making a decision
causes a person to split into multiple copies: one who
keeps on reading and one who doesn’t. From their frog
perspective, however, each of these alter egos is unaware
of the others and notices the branching merely as a slight
randomness: a certain probability of continuing to read
or not.
As strange as this may sound, the exact same situation
occurs even in the Level I multiverse. You have evidently
decided to keep on reading the article, but one of your
alter egos in a distant galaxy put down the magazine after
the first paragraph. The only difference between Level I
and Level III is where your doppelgaa¨ngers reside. In
Level I they live elsewhere in good old three-dimensional
space. In Level III they live on another quantum branch
in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space (Figure 5).
C. Level III parallel universes: evidence &
implications
The existence of Level III depends on one crucial as-
sumption: that the time evolution of the wave function
is unitary. So far experimenters have encountered no de-
partures from unitarity. In the past few decades they
have confirmed unitarity for ever larger systems, includ-
ing carbon 60 buckyball molecules and kilometer-long op-
tical fibers. On the theoretical side, the case for unitarity
has been bolstered by the discovery of decoherence (see
Tegmark & Wheeler 2001 for a popular review). Some
theorists who work on quantum gravity have questioned
unitarity; one concern is that evaporating black holes
might destroy information, which would be a nonuni-
tary process. But a recent breakthrough in string theory
known as AdS/CFT correspondence suggests that even
quantum gravity is unitary. If so, black holes do not
destroy information but merely transmit it elsewhere.
If physics is unitary, then the standard picture of how
quantum fluctuations operated early in the big bang must
change. These fluctuations did not generate initial con-
ditions at random. Rather they generated a quantum
superposition of all possible initial conditions, which co-
existed simultaneously. Decoherence then caused these
initial conditions to behave classically in separate quan-
tum branches. Here is the crucial point: the distribution
of outcomes on different quantum branches in a given
Hubble volume (Level III) is identical to the distribution
of outcomes in different Hubble volumes within a single
quantum branch (Level I). This property of the quantum
fluctuations is known in statistical mechanics as ergodic-
ity.
The same reasoning applies to Level II. The process
9of symmetry breaking did not produce a unique outcome
but rather a superposition of all outcomes, which rapidly
went their separate ways. So if physical constants, space-
time dimensionality and so on can vary among parallel
quantum branches at Level III, then they will also vary
among parallel universes at Level II.
In other words, the Level III multiverse adds nothing
new beyond Level I and Level II, just more indistinguish-
able copies of the same universes–the same old story lines
playing out again and again in other quantum branches.
The passionate debate about Everett’s theory therefore
seems to be ending in a grand anticlimax, with the dis-
covery of less controversial multiverses (Levels I and II)
that are equally large.
Needless to say, the implications are profound, and
physicists are only beginning to explore them. For in-
stance, consider the ramifications of the answer to a long-
standing question: Does the number of universes expo-
nentially increase over time? The surprising answer is
no. From the bird perspective, there is of course only
one quantum universe.
From the frog perspective, what matters is the number
of universes that are distinguishable at a given instant–
that is, the number of noticeably different Hubble vol-
umes. Imagine moving planets to random new locations,
imagine having married someone else, and so on. At the
quantum level, there are 10 to the 10118 universes with
temperatures below 108 kelvins. That is a vast number,
but a finite one.
From the frog perspective, the evolution of the wave
function corresponds to a never-ending sliding from one
of these 10 to the 10118 states to another. Now you are
in universe A, the one in which you are reading this sen-
tence. Now you are in universe B, the one in which you
are reading this other sentence. Put differently, universe
B has an observer identical to one in universe A, except
with an extra instant of memories. All possible states
exist at every instant, so the passage of time may be
in the eye of the beholder — an idea explored in Greg
Egan’s 1994 science-fiction novel Permutation City and
developed by physicist David Deutsch of the University of
Oxford, independent physicist Julian Barbour, and oth-
ers. The multiverse framework may thus prove essential
to understanding the nature of time.
D. Two world views
The debate over how classical mechanics emerges from
quantum mechanics continues, and the decoherence dis-
covery has shown that there is a lot more to it than just
letting Planck’s constant h¯ shrink to zero. Yet as Fig-
ure 6 illustrates, this is just a small piece of a larger puz-
zle. Indeed, the endless debate over the interpretation of
quantum mechanics — and even the broader issue of par-
allel universes — is in a sense the tip of an iceberg. In the
Sci-Fi spoof “Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy”, the an-
swer is discovered to be “42”, and the hard part is finding
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FIG. 6: Theories can be crudely organized into a family tree
where each might, at least in principle, be derivable from more
fundamental ones above it. For example, classical mechanics
can be obtained from special relativity in the approximation
that the speed of light c is infinite. Most of the arrows are
less well understood. All these theories have two components:
mathematical equations and words that explain how they are
connected to what we observe. At each level in the hierarchy
of theories, new words (e.g., protons, atoms, cells, organisms,
cultures) are introduced because they are convenient, cap-
turing the essence of what is going on without recourse to
the more fundamental theory above it. It is important to re-
member, however, that it is we humans who introduce these
concepts and the words for them: in principle, everything
could have been derived from the fundamental theory at the
top of the tree, although such an extreme reductionist ap-
proach would of course be useless in practice. Crudely speak-
ing, the ratio of equations to words decreases as we move down
the tree, dropping near zero for highly applied fields such as
medicine and sociology. In contrast, theories near the top
are highly mathematical, and physicists are still struggling
to understand the concepts, if any, in terms of which we can
understand them. The Holy Grail of physics is to find what
is jocularly referred to as a “Theory of Everything”, or TOE,
from which all else can be derived. If such a theory exists
at all, it should replace the big question mark at the top of
the theory tree. Everybody knows that something is missing
here, since we lack a consistent theory unifying gravity with
quantum mechanics.
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the real question. Questions about parallel universes may
seem to be just about as deep as queries about reality can
get. Yet there is a still deeper underlying question: there
are two tenable but diametrically opposed paradigms re-
garding physical reality and the status of mathematics,
a dichotomy that arguably goes as far back as Plato and
Aristotle, and the question is which one is correct.
• ARISTOTELIAN PARADIGM: The subjec-
tively perceived frog perspective is physically real,
and the bird perspective and all its mathematical
language is merely a useful approximation.
• PLATONIC PARADIGM: The bird perspec-
tive (the mathematical structure) is physically real,
and the frog perspective and all the human lan-
guage we use to describe it is merely a useful ap-
proximation for describing our subjective percep-
tions.
What is more basic — the frog perspective or the bird
perspective? What is more basic — human language
or mathematical language? Your answer will determine
how you feel about parallel universes. If you prefer the
Platonic paradigm, you should find multiverses natu-
ral, since our feeling that say the Level III multiverse
is “weird” merely reflects that the frog and bird perspec-
tives are extremely different. We break the symmetry by
calling the latter weird because we were all indoctrinated
with the Aristotelian paradigm as children, long before
we even heard of mathematics - the Platonic view is an
acquired taste!
In the second (Platonic) case, all of physics is ulti-
mately a mathematics problem, since an infinitely intel-
ligent mathematician given the fundamental equations of
the cosmos could in principle compute the frog perspec-
tive, i.e., compute what self-aware observers the universe
would contain, what they would perceive, and what lan-
guage they would invent to describe their perceptions
to one another. In other words, there is a “Theory of
Everything” (TOE) at the top of the tree in Figure 6
whose axioms are purely mathematical, since postulates
in English regarding interpretation would be derivable
and thus redundant. In the Aristotelian paradigm, on
the other hand, there can never be a TOE, since one is
ultimately just explaining certain verbal statements by
other verbal statements — this is known as the infinite
regress problem (Nozick 1981).
IV. LEVEL IV: OTHER MATHEMATICAL
STRUCTURES
Suppose you buy the Platonist paradigm and believe
that there really is a TOE at the top of Figure 6 — and
that we simply have not found the correct equations yet.
Then an embarrassing question remains, as emphasized
by John Archibald Wheeler: Why these particular equa-
tions, not others? Let us now explore the idea of mathe-
matical democracy, whereby universes governed by other
equations are equally real. This is the Level IV multi-
verse. First we need to digest two other ideas, however:
the concept of a mathematical structure, and the notion
that the physical world may be one.
A. What is a mathematical structure?
Many of us think of mathematics as a bag of tricks that
we learned in school for manipulating numbers. Yet most
mathematicians have a very different view of their field.
They study more abstract objects such as functions, sets,
spaces and operators and try to prove theorems about
the relations between them. Indeed, some modern math-
ematics papers are so abstract that the only numbers
you will find in them are the page numbers! What does
a dodecahedron have in common with a set of complex
numbers? Despite the plethora of mathematical struc-
tures with intimidating names like orbifolds and Killing
fields, a striking underlying unity has emerged in the
last century: all mathematical structures are just special
cases of one and the same thing: so-called formal sys-
tems. A formal system consists of abstract symbols and
rules for manipulating them, specifying how new strings
of symbols referred to as theorems can be derived from
given ones referred to as axioms. This historical devel-
opment represented a form of deconstructionism, since it
stripped away all meaning and interpretation that had
traditionally been given to mathematical structures and
distilled out only the abstract relations capturing their
very essence. As a result, computers can now prove the-
orems about geometry without having any physical intu-
ition whatsoever about what space is like.
Figure 7 shows some of the most basic mathematical
structures and their interrelations. Although this fam-
ily tree probably extends indefinitely, it illustrates that
there is nothing fuzzy about mathematical structures.
They are “out there” in the sense that mathematicians
discover them rather than create them, and that contem-
plative alien civilizations would find the same structures
(a theorem is true regardless of whether it is proven by
a human, a computer or an alien).
B. The possibility that the physical world is a
mathematical structure
Let us now digest the idea that physical world (specif-
ically, the Level III multiverse) is a mathematical struc-
ture. Although traditionally taken for granted by many
theoretical physicists, this is a deep and far-reaching no-
tion. It means that mathematical equations describe not
merely some limited aspects of the physical world, but all
aspects of it. It means that there is some mathematical
structure that is what mathematicians call isomorphic
(and hence equivalent) to our physical world, with each
physical entity having a unique counterpart in the math-
ematical structure and vice versa. Let us consider some
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examples.
A century ago, when classical physics still reigned
supreme, many scientists believed that physical space
was isomorphic to the mathematical structure known as
R3: three-dimensional Euclidean space. Moreover, some
thought that all forms of matter in the universe cor-
responded to various classical fields: the electric field,
the magnetic field and perhaps a few undiscovered ones,
mathematically corresponding to functions on R3 (a
handful of numbers at each point in space). In this
view (later proven incorrect), dense clumps of matter like
atoms were simply regions in space where some fields
were strong (where some numbers were large). These
fields evolved deterministically over time according to
some partial differential equations, and observers per-
ceived this as things moving around and events taking
place. Could, then, fields in three-dimensional space
be the mathematical structure corresponding to the uni-
verse? No, since a mathematical structure cannot change
— it is an abstract, immutable entity existing outside of
space and time. Our familiar frog perspective of a three-
dimensional space where events unfold is equivalent, from
the bird perspective, to a four-dimensional spacetime
where all of history is contained, so the mathematical
structure would be fields in four-dimensional space. In
other words, if history were a movie, the mathematical
structure would not correspond to a single frame of it,
but to the entire videotape.
Given a mathematical structure, we will say that it has
physical existence if any self-aware substructure (SAS)
within it subjectively, from its frog perspective, perceives
itself as living in a physically real world. What would,
mathematically, such an SAS be like? In the classical
physics example above, an SAS such as you would be
a tube through spacetime, a thick version of what Ein-
stein referred to as a world-line. The location of the tube
would specify your position in space at different times.
Within the tube, the fields would exhibit certain complex
behavior, corresponding to storing and processing infor-
mation about the field-values in the surroundings, and
at each position along the tube, these processes would
give rise to the familiar but mysterious sensation of self-
awareness.From its frog perspective, the SAS would per-
ceive this one-dimensional string of perceptions along the
tube as passage of time.
Although our example illustrates the idea of how our
physical world can be a mathematical structure, this par-
ticular mathematical structure (fields in four-dimensional
space) is now known to be the wrong one. After real-
izing that spacetime could be curved, Einstein doggedly
searched for a so-called unified field theory where the uni-
verse was what mathematicians call a 3+1-dimensional
pseudo-Riemannian manifold with tensor fields (top cen-
ter in Figure 7), but this failed to account for the ob-
served behavior of atoms. According to quantum field
theory, the modern synthesis of special relativity theory
and quantum theory, the universe (in this case the Level
III multiverse) is a mathematical structure known as an
algebra of operator-valued fields (top right in Figure 7).
Here the question of what constitutes an SAS is more
subtle (Tegmark 2000). However, this fails to describe
black hole evaporation, the first instance of the Big Bang
and other quantum gravity phenomena, so the true math-
ematical structure isomorphic to our universe, if it exists,
has not yet been found.
C. Mathematical democracy
Now suppose that our physical world really is a math-
ematical structure, and that you are an SAS within it.
This means that in the Mathematics tree of Figure 7, one
of the boxes is our universe. (The full tree is probably
infinite in extent, so our particular box is not one of the
few boxes from the bottom of the tree that are shown.)
In other words, this particular mathematical structure
enjoys not only mathematical existence, but physical ex-
istence as well. What about all the other boxes in the
tree? Do they too enjoy physical existence? If not, there
would be a fundamental, unexplained ontological asym-
metry built into the very heart of reality, splitting mathe-
matical structures into two classes: those with and with-
out physical existence. As a way out of this philosophical
conundrum, I have suggested (Tegmark 1998) that com-
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plete mathematical democracy holds: that mathemat-
ical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so
that all mathematical structures exist physically as well.
This is the Level IV multiverse. It can be viewed as a
form of radical Platonism, asserting that the mathemat-
ical structures in Plato’s realm of ideas, the Mindscape
of Rucker (1982), exist “out there” in a physical sense
(Davies 1993), casting the so-called modal realism the-
ory of David Lewis (1986) in mathematical terms akin to
what Barrow (1991; 1992) refers to as “pi in the sky”. If
this theory is correct, then since it has no free parame-
ters, all properties of all parallel universes (including the
subjective perceptions of SASs in them) could in princi-
ple be derived by an infinitely intelligent mathematician.
D. Evidence for a Level IV multiverse
We have described the four levels of parallel universes
in order of increasing speculativeness, so why should we
believe in Level IV? Logically, it rests on two separate
assumptions:
• Assumption 1: That the physical world (specif-
ically our level III multiverse) is a mathematical
structure
• Assumption 2: Mathematical democracy: that
all mathematical structures exist “out there” in the
same sense
In a famous essay, Wigner (1967) argued that “the
enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sci-
ences is something bordering on the mysterious”, and
that “there is no rational explanation for it”. This argu-
ment can be taken as support for assumption 1: here the
utility of mathematics for describing the physical world
is a natural consequence of the fact that the latter is
a mathematical structure, and we are simply uncover-
ing this bit by bit. The various approximations that
constitute our current physics theories are successful be-
cause simple mathematical structures can provide good
approximations of how a SAS will perceive more complex
mathematical structures. In other words, our successful
theories are not mathematics approximating physics, but
mathematics approximating mathematics. Wigner’s ob-
servation is unlikely to be based on fluke coincidences,
since far more mathematical regularity in nature has been
discovered in the decades since he made it, including the
standard model of particle physics.
A second argument supporting assumption 1 is that
abstract mathematics is so general that any TOE that is
definable in purely formal terms (independent of vague
human terminology) is also a mathematical structure.
For instance, a TOE involving a set of different types
of entities (denoted by words, say) and relations between
them (denoted by additional words) is nothing but what
mathematicians call a set-theoretical model, and one can
generally find a formal system that it is a model of.
This argument also makes assumption 2 more appeal-
ing, since it implies that any conceivable parallel uni-
verse theory can be described at Level IV. The Level IV
multiverse, termed the “ultimate Ensemble theory” in
Tegmark (1997) since it subsumes all other ensembles,
therefore brings closure to the hierarchy of multiverses,
and there cannot be say a Level V. Considering an en-
semble of mathematical structures does not add anything
new, since this is still just another mathematical struc-
ture. What about the frequently discussed notion that
the universe is a computer simulation? This idea occurs
frequently in science fiction and has been substantially
elaborated (e.g., Schmidthuber 1997; Wolfram 2002).
The information content (memory state) of a digital com-
puter is a string of bits, say “1001011100111001...” of
great but finite length, equivalent to some large but fi-
nite integer n written in binary. The information pro-
cessing of a computer is a deterministic rule for chang-
ing each memory state into another (applied over and
over again), so mathematically, it is simply a function f
mapping the integers onto themselves that gets iterated:
n 7→ f(n) 7→ f(f(n)) 7→ .... In other words, even the
most sophisticated computer simulation is just yet an-
other special case of a mathematical structure, and is al-
ready included in the Level IV multiverse. (Incidentally,
iterating continuous functions rather than integer-valued
ones can give rise to fractals.)
A second argument for assumption 2 is that if two en-
tities are isomorphic, then there is no meaningful sense
in which they are not one and the same (Cohen 2003).
This implies assumption 2 when the entities in question
are a physical universe and a mathematical structure de-
scribing it, respectively. To avoid this conclusion that
mathematical and physical existence are equivalent, one
would need to argue that our universe is somehow made
of stuff perfectly described by a mathematical structure,
but which also has other properties that are not described
by it. However, this violates assumption 1 and implies
either that it is isomorphic to a more complicated math-
ematical structure or that it is not mathematical at all.
The latter would be make Karl Popper turn in his grave,
since those additional bells and whistles that make the
universe non-mathematical by definition have no observ-
able effects whatsoever.
Another appealing feature of assumption 2 is that it
provides the only answer so far to Wheeler’s question:
Why these particular equations, not others? Having uni-
verses dance to the tune of all possible equations also
resolves the fine-tuning problem of Section II C once and
for all, even at the fundamental equation level: although
many if not most mathematical structures are likely to
be dead and devoid of SASs, failing to provide the com-
plexity, stability and predictability that SASs require, we
of course expect to find with 100% probability that we
inhabit a mathematical structure capable of supporting
life. Because of this selection effect, the answer to the
question “what is it that breathes fire into the equations
and makes a universe for them to describe?” (Hawking
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1993) would then be “you, the SAS”.
E. What are Level IV parallel universes like?
The way we use, test and potentially rule out any the-
ory is to compute probability distributions for our future
perceptions given our past perceptions and to compare
these predictions with our observed outcome. In a mul-
tiverse theory, there is typically more than one SAS that
has experienced a past life identical to yours, so there is
no way to determine which one is you. To make predic-
tions, you therefore have to compute what fractions of
them will perceive what in the future, which leads to the
following predictions:
• Prediction 1: The mathematical structure de-
scribing our world is the most generic one that is
consistent with our observations.
• Prediction 2: Our future observations are the
most generic ones that are consistent with our past
observations.
• Prediction 3: Our past observations are the most
generic ones that are consistent with our existence.
We will return to the problem of what “generic” means
in Section VB (the measure problem). However, one
striking feature of mathematical structures, discussed in
detail in Tegmark (1997), is that the sort of symmetry
and invariance properties that are responsible for the sim-
plicity and orderliness of our universe tend to be generic,
more the rule than the exception — mathematical struc-
tures tend to have them by default, and complicated ad-
ditional axioms etc. must be added to make them go
away. In other words, because of both this and selec-
tion effects, we should not necessarily expect life in the
Level IV multiverse to be a disordered mess.
V. DISCUSSION
We have seen that scientific theories of parallel uni-
verses form a four-level hierarchy, in which universes be-
come progressively more different from ours. They might
have different initial conditions (Level I), different effec-
tive physical laws, constants and particles (Level II), or
different fundamental physical laws (Level IV). It is ironic
that Level III is the one that has drawn the most fire in
the past decades, because it is the only one that adds no
qualitatively new types of universes.
Whereas the Level I universes join seemlessly, there are
clear demarcations between those within levels II and III
caused by inflating space and decoherence, respectively.
The level IV universes are completely disconnected and
need to be considered together only for predicting your
future, since “you” may exist in more than one of them.
A. Future prospects
There are ample future prospects for testing and per-
haps ruling out these multiverse theories. In the com-
ing decade, dramatically improved cosmological measure-
ments of the microwave background radiation, the large-
scale matter distribution, etc., will test Level I by fur-
ther constraining the curvature and topology of space and
will test level II by providing stringent tests of inflation.
Progress in both astrophysics and high-energy physics
should also clarify the extent to which various physical
constants are fine-tuned, thereby weakening or strength-
ening the case for Level II. If the current world-wide effort
to build quantum computers succeeds, it will provide fur-
ther evidence for Level III, since they would, in essence,
be exploiting the parallelism of the Level III multiverse
for parallel computation (Deutsch 1997). Conversely, ex-
perimental evidence of unitarity violation would rule out
Level III. Finally, success or failure in the grand challenge
of modern physics, unifying general relativity and quan-
tum field theory, will shed more light on Level IV. Either
we will eventually find a mathematical structure match-
ing our universe, or we will bump up against a limit to
the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics and have
to abandon Level IV.
B. The measure problem
There are also interesting theoretical issues to resolve
within the multiverse theories, first and foremost the
measure problem.
As multiverse theories gain credence, the sticky issue of
how to compute probabilities in physics is growing from a
minor nuisance into a major embarrassment. If there are
indeed many identical copies of you, the traditional no-
tion of determinism evaporates. You could not compute
your own future even if you had complete knowledge of
the entire state of the multiverse, because there is no way
for you to determine which of these copies is you (they all
feel they are). All you can predict, therefore, are prob-
abilities for what you would observe. If an outcome has
a probability of, say, 50 percent, it means that half the
observers observe that outcome.
Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to compute what
fraction of the infinitely many observers perceive what.
The answer depends on the order in which you count
them. By analogy, the fraction of the integers that are
even is 50 percent if you order them numerically (1, 2,
3, 4, ...) but approaches 100 percent if you sort them
digit by digit, the way your word processor would (1, 10,
100, 1,000, ...). When observers reside in disconnected
universes, there is no obviously natural way in which to
order them. Instead one must sample from the differ-
ent universes with some statistical weights referred to by
mathematicians as a “measure”.
This problem crops up in a mild and treatable manner
at Level I, becomes severe at Level II (see Tegmark 2004
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for a detailed review), has caused much debate at Level
III (de Witt 2003, Mukhanov 2005), and is horrendous at
Level IV. At Level II, for instance, Linde, Vilenkin and
others have published predictions for the probability dis-
tributions of various cosmological parameters. They have
argued that different parallel universes that have inflated
by different amounts should be given statistical weights
proportional to their volume (e.g., Garriga & Vilenkin
2001a). On the other hand, any mathematician will tell
you that 2 × ∞ = ∞, so there is no objective sense in
which an infinite universe that has expanded by a factor
of two has gotten larger. Moreover, a finite universe with
the topology of a torus is equivalent to a perfectly peri-
odic universe with infinite volume, both from the mathe-
matical bird perspective and from the frog perspective of
an observer within it. So why should its infinitely smaller
volume give it zero statistical weight? After all, even in
the Level I multiverse, Hubble volumes start repeating
(albeit in a random order, not periodically) after about
10 to the 10118 meters.
If you think that is bad, consider the problem of assign-
ing statistical weights to different mathematical struc-
tures at Level IV. The fact that our universe seems rel-
atively simple has led many people to suggest that the
correct measure somehow involves complexity.
C. The pros and cons of parallel universes
So should you believe in parallel universes? We have
seen that this is not a yes/no question — rather, the most
interesting issue is whether there are 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 levels
of multiverses. Figure 1 summarizes the evidence that
we have discussed for the different levels. The principal
arguments against them are that they are wasteful and
that they are weird.
The wastefulness argument is that multiverse theories
are vulnerable to Occam’s razor because they postulate
the existence of other worlds that we can never observe.
Why should nature be so wasteful and indulge in such
opulence as an infinity of different worlds? Yet this ar-
gument can be turned around to argue for a multiverse.
What precisely would nature be wasting? Certainly not
space, mass or atoms–the uncontroversial Level I multi-
verse already contains an infinite amount of all three, so
who cares if nature wastes some more? The real issue
here is the apparent reduction in simplicity. A skeptic
worries about all the information necessary to specify all
those unseen worlds.
But an entire ensemble is often much simpler than one
of its members. This principle can be stated more for-
mally using the notion of algorithmic information con-
tent. The algorithmic information content in a number
is, roughly speaking, the length of the shortest computer
program that will produce that number as output. For
example, consider the set of all integers. Which is sim-
pler, the whole set or just one number? Naively, you
might think that a single number is simpler, but the
entire set can be generated by quite a trivial computer
program, whereas a single number can be hugely long.
Therefore, the whole set is actually simpler.
Similarly, the set of all solutions to Einstein’s field
equations is simpler than a specific solution. The for-
mer is described by a few equations, whereas the latter
requires the specification of vast amounts of initial data
on some hypersurface. The lesson is that complexity in-
creases when we restrict our attention to one particular
element in an ensemble, thereby losing the symmetry and
simplicity that were inherent in the totality of all the el-
ements taken together.
In this sense, the higher-level multiverses are simpler.
Going from our universe to the Level I multiverse elimi-
nates the need to specify initial conditions, upgrading to
Level II eliminates the need to specify physical constants,
and the Level IV multiverse eliminates the need to spec-
ify anything at all. The opulence of complexity is all in
the subjective perceptions of observers (Tegmark 1996)
— the frog perspective. From the bird perspective, the
multiverse could hardly be any simpler.
The complaint about weirdness is aesthetic rather than
scientific, and it really makes sense only in the Aris-
totelian worldview. Yet what did we expect? When
we ask a profound question about the nature of real-
ity, do we not expect an answer that sounds strange?
Evolution provided us with intuition for the everyday
physics that had survival value for our distant ancestors,
so whenever we venture beyond the everyday world, we
should expect it to seem bizarre. Thanks to clever in-
ventions, we have glimpsed slightly beyond the frog per-
spective of our normal inside view, and sure enough, we
have encountered bizarre phenomena whenever depart-
ing from human scales in any way: at high speeds (time
slows down), on small scales (quantum particles can be
at several places at once), on large scales (black holes),
at low temperatures (liquid Helium can flow upward), at
high temperatures (colliding particles can change iden-
tity), etc..
A common feature of all four multiverse levels is that
the simplest and arguably most elegant theory involves
parallel universes by default. To deny the existence of
those universes, one needs to complicate the theory by
adding experimentally unsupported processes and ad hoc
postulates: finite space, wave function collapse, ontologi-
cal asymmetry, etc. Our judgment therefore comes down
to which we find more wasteful and inelegant: many
worlds or many words. Perhaps we will gradually get
more used to the weird ways of our cosmos, and even
find its strangeness to be part of its charm.
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